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I. INTRODUCTION
Millions of people attend sporting events as spectators every
year, whether professional, college, high school, little league or even
pick-up games at a local park. While most of the spectators are aware
that there is some risk of injury in attending these events-for exam-
ple, being hit by a foul ball at a baseball game-few, if any, consciously
analyze all the potential risks associated with viewing a particular
sporting event. However, the courts have long recognized that certain
risks are inherent in sporting events, including injuries to spectators,
and have often imposed limited duties on the owners of the facilities
and organizers of the sporting events.
Baseball was the only significant professional sport played for
many years. This has led to many cases involving injuries to baseball
spectators. While baseball has a unique place in American culture, and
in American law,' in recent times, litigation has arisen from specta-
tors' injuries while viewing sports, including hockey, soccer, golf,
skateboarding, volleyball, and other spectator sports.
As long as there have been sporting contests, lawyers have
looked to ensure the safety of those sporting events by bringing per-
sonal injury actions for injuries to spectators. 2 These claims are
usually brought under negligence theory; however, courts have differed
1. Yates v. Chicago Nat'1 League Ball Club, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 570 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
2. See generally Roger I. Abrams, Two Sports Torts: The Historical Development of the
Legal Rights of Baseball Spectators, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 433 (2003) (offering history of sports
torts ).
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with respect to what duty the owner/operator owes to spectators. There
are two primary interpretations of the duty element in these cases.
The first is that applied under traditional negligence theory. That is,
the owner and/or organizer owe a duty to the spectators to take reason-
able care to protect spectators from foreseeable injuries. This is
generally a question of fact for a jury.3 The second is a limited duty
rule. In essence, this rule says that the owner and/or organizer owe a
limited duty to the spectator to protect those spectators that are sub-
ject to a high risk of injury. Importantly, courts have also recognized
assumption of the risk as an affirmative defense, which says that the
spectator assumes the risks inherent in viewing a sporting event and
acts as a complete bar to liability.4 An inquiry that often arises in ana-
lyzing these issues is what particular activity the spectator was doing
at the time of the injury. For example, the owner/operator may have a
greater duty to spectators at concession stands or in ticket lines when
the spectator's full attention is not on the game.5 Of course, each of
these practices has its own advantages and disadvantages. Thus, this
article argues for a unified theory that combines parts of each to better
balance the interests of all parties involved.
II. NEGLIGENCE
Claims brought by injured sports spectators are most often
brought under traditional negligence principles. However, the duty ele-
ment of this theory is applied differently in various jurisdictions. For
instance, modifications of the negligence theory include the application
of a limited duty rule6 and the affirmative defense, assumption of the
risk.7 The first interpretation of the duty owed by an owner and/or op-
erator of a sporting arena employs traditional negligence principles: a
3. Riley v. Chicago Cougars Hockey Club, Inc., 427 N.E.2d 290, 293 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981).
4. Goade v. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Pomona, Cal., Lodge No. 789,
213 Cal. App. 2d 189 (1963) ("The defense of assumption of risk is available when there has
been a voluntary acceptance of a risk, and such acceptance, whether express or implied, has
been made with knowledge and appreciation of the risk.").
5. Maisonave v. Newark Bears Pro. Baseball Club, Inc., 881 A.2d 700 (N.J. 2005).
6. The limited duty rule essentially states that the landowner or operator has
discharged its duty by taking certain appropriate actions, for example protective netting.
See Schneider v. Am. Hockey and Ice Skating Ctr., Inc., 777 A.2d 380, 384 (N.J. App. Div.
2001) (describing limited duty rule); see also discussion infra Part XX.
7. The assumption of risk defense provides that the spectator assumed any risk of
danger inherent in the game regardless of the actions taken by owner/operator. See Gentry
v. Craycraft, 802 N.E.2d 1116, 1119-20 (Ohio 2004) (describing assumption of the risk); see
also discussion infra Part XX.
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landowner has a duty to exercise reasonable care for the maintenance
of the premises for the protection of visitors." It is generally a question
of fact as to whether the harm was foreseeable and whether the owner/
operator took appropriate action.9
Sometimes traditional negligence principles are applied be-
cause of statutory authority passed by the respective state legislatures.
For example, to prove liability for the condition of buildings within the
care and custody of a public body in Louisiana, a plaintiff must show
that the field had a defect which caused unreasonable harm; that
plaintiffs injury was caused by the defect; and defendant had actual or
constructive notice of the condition.' 0 Under Colorado law, an invitee
may make a claim for damages caused by a landlord's unreasonable
failure to exercise reasonable care of protecting against dangers of
which he knew or should have known." In Teneyck v. Royal Hockey of
Colorado, the Colorado Supreme Court specifically rejected the no duty
rule as applied to hockey because of the premises liability statute.12
However, the negligence theory is the minority rule in the
United States regarding injury to spectators, with only a few states
adhering to this rule.' 3 Indeed, as noted above, baseball holds such a
revered position in the United States that several states that have
adopted the negligence rule by court decision have passed legislation
protecting the owners and operators of baseball facilities.14 Interest-
ingly, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that because the legislature
carved out certain exceptions to landowner's liability, specifically for
baseball and not other sports, there was a presumption that hockey
was meant to be excluded from the act, and the defendant, Roller
Hockey Colorado, Ltd., could not be exempt from civil liability under
8. Allred v. Capital Area Soccer League, Inc., 669 S.E.2d 777, 781-82 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008).
9. See Riley, 427 N.E.2d at 293 ("Whether the requisite care was exercised is a
question of fact for the jury.").
10. Reider v. La. Bd. of Trs., 897 So. 2d 893, 896 (La. Ct. App. 2005); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2800 (West 2009).
11. See Teneyck v. Royal Hockey Of Colorado, Ltd., 10 P.3d 707, 708 (Colo. App. 2000);
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-21-115 (West 2009).
12. Id.
13. See Schneider, 777 A.2d at 384 (recognizing that the limited duty rule prevails in
U.S. jurisdictions); cf Hook v. Lakeside Park Co., 351 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1960); City of Coral
Springs v. Rippe, 743 S.2d 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Riley, 427 N.E.2d at 293, 667;
Reider v. State Bd. Of Trs., 897 S.2d 893 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Allred, 669 S.E.2d 777.
14. Colorado Baseball Spectator Safety Act, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-120 (West
2009); Baseball Facility Liability Act, 745 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 38/10 (West 2009).
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the statute.15 Thus, the summary judgment granted in favor of the
defendant was reversed.16
Of course, just because a state applies the general negligence
theory does not mean that it cannot apply other rules to conclude that
the owner/operator did not owe a duty to the spectator. In Shain v.
Racine Raiders Football Club, Inc., a youth football coach was injured
when he was coaching a team and was hit by players from an adjoining
field.' 7 The court analyzed the statute applying a general reasonable-
ness standard for owners of property and analyzed the "baseball rule"
articulated in Powless v. Milwaukee County.'8 The court also noted
that Wisconsin had abolished the assumption of risk defense.' 9 The
court concluded, as a matter of law, that the coach could not recover
because of contributory negligence. 20 "The nature of the sport of foot-
ball and the intrinsic hazards of playing it and coaching it are widely
comprehended." 2 1 The court determined that the plaintiff, a football
coach, was a hybrid of spectator and participant. 22 The coach was a
spectator because he observed the game, "with a critical eye of a
coach[;]"23 however, as a coach, he was also something of a participant
because he was an integral part of the workings of the team.24 The
court also reasoned that if a spectator is held to know the risks inher-
ent in merely being present at a sporting event, the coach is surely held
to a similar standard. 25 Therefore, a coach standing on the sidelines
voluntarily places himself within the zone danger.26 While the court
termed this contributory negligence, 27 the analysis was nearer to as-
sumption of risk than traditional contributory negligence.
Thus, while a few states adhere to general negligence principles
when determining the duty owed by owners/operators of sporting
events to spectators, those states often find other ways to exempt such
defendants from obligations, whether by statute or by other legal theo-
15. Teneyck, 10 P.3d at 709-10.
16. Id. at 710.
17. Shain v. Racine Raiders Football Club, Inc., 726 N.W.2d 346, 350-51 (2006).
18. Id.; see Powless v. Milwaukee County, 94 N.W.2d 187 (Wis. 1959) (finding no
liability for injuries to sport spectators).
19. Shain, 726 N.W.2d 352.
20. See id. at 352.
21. Id.





27. See id. at 352.
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ries, including contributory negligence. Thus, even under a negligence
theory, the burden is high for plaintiffs to establish a cause of action
against the owners/operators of sports facilities.
III. LIMITED DuTY RULE
The second view of what duty is owed to spectators at sporting
events is the limited duty rule. This rule has been adopted by several
states. 28 As stated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the limited
duty rule is unique in that it only "applies to sports venues in respect of
a specific peril[:] that of objects leaving the field of play that may injure
spectators in the stands."29 Such a venue must provide sufficient
screening for (1) "'those spectators who may be reasonably anticipated
to desire protected seats on an ordinary occasion[,]"' and (2) "'in the
most dangerous section of the stands,"' to satisfy its duty of care to
spectators. 30 This generally applies to all sports.3 1 In addition, the
limited duty rule applies to all aspects of activities of the field of play,32
including pre-game warm-ups, and generally includes no duty to warn
spectators of potential dangers.33 The limited duty rule is a modifica-
tion of the "no duty rule."34 Whereas under the no duty rule an owner/
operator owes no duty at all to spectators regarding the dangers inher-
ent in watching a game, under the limited duty rule a duty may arise
in some instances.3 5
One determination that must be made under the limited duty
rule is what the spectator was doing when they were injured. Cer-
tainly when spectators are in the stands watching the game the limited
duty rule is applicable, and as long as the owner/operator has complied
with the requirements of the limited duty rule, no liability will be im-
posed.36 However, questions have arisen as to the scope of the limited
28. Bellezzo v. State of Ariz., 851 P.2d 847 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Teixiera v. New
Britain Baseball Club, Inc., No. HHBCV054004214S, 2006 WL 2413839 (Conn. Super. Ct.
July 18, 2006); Arnold v. City of Cedar Rapids, 443 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1989); Benejam v.
Detroit Tigers, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); Grisim v. Tetmark Charity Pro-
Golf Tournament, 415 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. 1987); Turner v. Mandalay Sports
Entertainment, LLC, 180 P.3d 1172 (Nev. 2008).
29. Sciarrotta v. Global Spectrum, 944 A.2d 630, 631 (N.J. 2008)
30. Id. (quoting Schneider, 777 A.2d 380, 384 (N.J. App. Div. 2001)).
31. Sciarrotta, 944 A.2d at 632
32. Id. at 632.
33. Id. at 639.
34. See Teneyck, 10 P.3d at 709.
35. Schneider, 777 A.2d at 384.
36. See, e.g., Arnold, 443 N.W.2d at 333-34 ("The defendants have screened the most
dangerous parts of the spectator's stands, behind home plate. There was sufficient seating
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duty rule when the spectator is not in the stands. In Turner v. Manda-
lay Sports Entertainment, LLC., a patron was injured while she was
sitting in a concession area of the stadium, not in the stands,37 and
there was no protective netting in the area.3 8 The court held that the
limited duty rule barred recovery, even for an injury sustained in the
concession area.39 In its analysis, the court determined that because
the plaintiff decided not to sit in a protected seating area, the only
question was whether the concession area was one of the most danger-
ous areas of the ballpark and posed an unduly high risk of injury.40
The court noted that the mere risk of an occasional foul ball does not
amount to an unduly high risk of injury.4 1 Additionally, the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that any other spectator suffered injuries as a
result of a foul ball in a concession area. 42 Therefore, the court held,
the plaintiff could not recover against the owner/operator of the
facility.43
Three judges dissented.44 The dissent, citing a New Jersey
case, Maisonave v. Newark Bath Professional Baseball Club, would
have held that the limited duty rule is, as the name implies, limited,
and permits recovery for patrons no longer "engaged" in the game. 45 In
sum, the dissent argued that a jury should decide whether a protected
screen or barrier was necessary for the concession area.46
In Maisonave,47 the Supreme Court of New Jersey spent a con-
siderable amount of time analyzing the history of the limited duty
there for this plaintiff. Defendants owed her nothing further."); see also Bellezzo, 851 P.2d
847 (allowing no recovery for spectator struck by foul ball who was not seated in a screened
off area).
37. Turner, 180 P.3d 1172.
38. Id. at 1174.
39. Id. at 1178.




44. Id. at 1178 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
45. Id. (citing Maisonave, 881 A.2d 700).
46. Id.
47. The reader should note that the decision in Maisonave was superseded by statute,
which provides in pertinent part:
The assumption of risk shall be a complete bar to suit and serve as a complete
defense to a suit against an owner by a spectator with certain stated exceptions
. ... [T]he inherent risks of observing a professional baseball game are defined as
injuries that result from being struck by a baseball or baseball bat while anywhere
on the premises during a professional baseball game.
N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:53A-43 (West 2009); see also Sciarrotta, 944 A.2d at 636 (holding that
Maisonave was superseded by statute and that limited duty rule is inapplicable).
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rule.48 The court then compared the limited duty rule to the general
rule of negligence imposed upon a business.49 The court stated:
[t]he limited duty rule insures that those spectators desiring protec-
tion from foul balls will be accommodated and the seats in the most
dangerous area of the stadium will be safe. At the same time, it
recognizes baseball tradition and spectator preference by not re-
quiring the owner to screen the entire stadium.50
The New Jersey court ultimately limited the application of the limited
duty rule to spectators while in the stands.5 1 When patrons are not in
the stands, the general rules of negligence apply to the specific area
and activity engaged by an injured party.52
The Maisonave court also described the criticisms regarding the
limited duty rule.5 3 Some commentators have attacked the limited
duty rule as anachronistic and not applicable to the current state of
tort rule. 54 However, these general attacks on limited duty rule
demonstrate a lack of understanding of one of the primary reasons peo-
ple go to sporting events. A simple trip to a stadium reveals thousands
of fans, including many children, attending the game with their base-
ball gloves. They do this in anticipation of catching a ball. While few
people actually catch a ball, the mere anticipation is a highlight for
many. The memory of actually catching a ball at a stadium often re-
mains with people for a lifetime. If a field were completely enclosed,
any thought of catching a ball would be eliminated. In addition, many
fans enjoy the close contact with the players. This connection could not
occur if the field was entirely behind a screen. As noted in Maisonave,
baseball tradition and spectator preference favors protection in limited
areas of a stadium.55
While some argue that the burden should be on the owners to
provide more protection for fans,5 6 such additional protection for fans
may also be a detriment to the experience of attending a live game.
Simply stated, the more balls that are prevented from leaving the
stands means fewer balls may be caught by spectators. In addition,
48. See Maisonave, 881 A.2d at 702.
49. Id. at 703-09.
50. Id. at 706 (quoting Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Utah
1995)).
51. Id. at 709.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 706.
54. Id. at 706-07.
55. Id. at 705-06.
56. Id. at 706 (citing David Horton, Rethinking Assumption Of Risk And Sport
Spectators, 51 UCLA L.Rev. 339, 344-45 (2003)).
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any further protection automatically creates viewing problems. Most
fans would not want to go to a sporting event that is completely sur-
rounded by protective netting obstructing the view of the field. Even
without consideration of the cost of such protection, it would certainly
take away from the enjoyment of the game. This principle is aptly
stated in Maisonave:
[i]t would be unfair to hold owners and operators liable for injuries
to spectators in the stands when the potential danger of fly balls in
an inherent, expected, and even desired part of the baseball fans
experience. Moreover, owners and operators would face undue
hardship if forced to guarantee protection for all fans in the stands
from every fly ball. Because the limited duty rule fairly balances
the practical and economic interests of owners and operators with
the safety and entertainment interests of the fans, we adopt the
Appellate Division's opinion in Schneider, to the extent that it holds
that owners and operators must offer sufficient protected seating to
those who would seek it on an ordinary basis and to provide screen-
ing in the most dangerous sections of the stands.57
Deciding whether there is a duty based on traditional negli-
gence principles gives the issue of whether an owner or operator took
reasonable precautions to a jury. Doing this on a case-by-case basis is
impracticable. The possibility of contrary verdicts would create an im-
possible situation for an owner/operator. One jury might believe that
the provided protection is reasonable, while another jury might believe
that the same protection was insufficient. This is simply an unwork-
able solution.
Most recently, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico, in Crespin,
held that the general negligence theory is applicable to injuries to spec-
tators at baseball games and rejected the limited duty rule.5 8 In that
case, an infant plaintiff was attending a minor league baseball game
and, during pre-game batting practice, was hit by a batted ball.5 9
Plaintiffs family was seated at a picnic table in the left field stands
eating during a pre-game little league party.6 0 The picnic tables were
not facing the field.6 1
The Crespin court rejected the limited duty rule: "[in addition,
we do not believe it is necessary to immunize the Isotopes and the City
against all risks in order to preserve the game of baseball."62 The court
57. Id. at 706.
58. Crespin v. Albuquerque Baseball Club, LLC, 2009-NMCA-27,864 , 216 P.3d 827.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 829.
61. Id. at 830.
62. Id. at 835.
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noted that, even without the limited duty rule, many claims would be
barred under traditional negligence principles if the jury determined
that the stadium owner used reasonable means to provide a safe sta-
dium to spectators.6 3
Crespin shows the weakness of determining duty on general
negligence principles, and highlights the strength of the unified theory
discussed below. The Crespin court went too far in rejecting the lim-
ited duty rule, and indeed a complete rejection was not necessary to its
decision. The court rejected the limited duty rule because an owner
should not be immunized against "all risks" associated with a baseball
game. 64 However, the limited duty rule does not immunize an owner
against "all risks," only those risks assumed when a spectator is in the
stands and engaged in the game.65 In Crespin, evidence was produced
that the picnic table did not face the field, and the spectators were ac-
tually distracted by a pre-game party.66 This may have been sufficient
to defeat summary judgment and send the case to a jury, even applying
the limited duty rule. As in Maisonave, the spectator in Crespin was in
an eating area and his attention was actually distracted. The rational
of Maisonave, therefore, could apply equally to the facts in Crespin.
The Crespin court left all issues of duty, traditionally the prov-
ince of the judge, to the jury. This, as noted, could lead to inconsistent
verdicts. For example, the jury in Crespin may have determined that
the owner was not negligent. However, if another spectator was in-
jured at the same game as the plaintiff in Crespin, a different jury
could find that the actions of the owner did not provide reasonable pro-
tection for spectators. Another jury might determine that a spectator
in the stands who is distracted by the scoreboard has a cause of action
against an owner/operator. This places a difficult burden on an owner
to decide what protection is necessary. This is precisely why issues of
duty should be determined by a judge.
The Maisonave rationale-that there is a limited duty for pro-
tection of the fans while in the stands, but not necessarily when fans
are at concession stands and distracted by ordering and obtaining food,
drinks, or souvenirs-makes sense. A jury, making its decision under
the limited duty rule, could accurately and reasonably determine
whether the protection provided by stadiums in areas where a specta-
tor is not actually involved in watching the game was appropriate. This
rule could also be analyzed under the assumption of risk theory to de-
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Maisonave, 881 A.2d at 708.
66. Crespin, at 829-30.
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termine whether the spectator actually assumed a risk of being injured
while not watching the event in the stands.
The fact that the limited duty rule has its origins in the earliest
days of baseball does not mean it's anachronistic or unfair. The limited
duty rule seeks to balance an operators' duty to ensure the safety of the
public with that of the public's ability to enjoy a sporting event, includ-
ing all the elements that go with sporting events, such as the potential
for souvenirs, interaction with players, and unobstructed views.
IV. AsSUMPTION OF RISK
The final theory regarding injuries to spectators at sporting
events is assumption of the risk. With assumption of the risk, a person
is deemed to have assumed "those commonly appreciated risks which
are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and
flow from such participation."6 7 'Pursuant to the primary assumption
of risk doctrine[,] a plaintiff also assumes risks attributable 'to any
open and obvious condition of the place where [the sporting activity] is
carried on." 68
Thus, the scope of plaintiffs assumption of risk and consequent
limitation upon an owner's duty varies depending on a particular
plaintiffs capacity to appreciate the risks of the activity.69 "The doc-
trine is potentially broad, and may encompass risks engendered by less
than optimum conditions, provided that those conditions are open and
obvious and that the consequently arising risks are readily
appreciable."70
While assumption of the risk is generally a complete defense to
potential liability, some courts have merged assumption of risk with
the limited duty theory. Thus, some courts have stated that, under the
doctrine of assumption of risk, a landowner's duty is limited to exercis-
ing care to make the conditions as safe as they appear to be.7 1 If the
risks of the activity are comprehended or obvious, plaintiff has as-
sumed such risks and the landowner has performed its duties. 72
New York has led the way in applying assumption of the risk to
claims brought by spectators at sporting events. In the last five years
67. Roberts v. Boys & Girls Republic, Inc., 51 A.D.3d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
(quoting Morgan v. State of New York, 90 N.Y. 2d 471, 484 (1997)).
68. Id. at 248 (quoting Maddox v City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d 270, 277 (1985)).
69. Id. at 247.
70. Id. at 248.
71. Id. (citing Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y. 2d 432, 439 (1986)).
72. See id. (citing Turcotte, at 439).
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alone, no less than six cases have reached the Appellate Division, New
York's intermediary appellate court, regarding this issue.73 In those
cases, New York courts have consistently upheld the assumption of
risk doctrine and have denied recovery in a variety of circumstances. 74
The particular sporting event, when the specific injury occurred, or
how it occurred, is not determinative of liability in New York. 75 As
long as the injured party knew or should have known of potential dan-
ger, plaintiff is considered to have assumed the risk of such danger and
cannot recover.76
New York takes a very broad view of the assumption of risk
doctrine. However, other states have placed greater restrictions on its
application. For example, in Sutton v. Sumner the plaintiff was in the
pit area of a racetrack while a tow truck was towing one of the race
cars into the pit area.7 7 Plaintiff was aware that there was a danger of
being hit by a tow truck and that if the car was being towed without
someone steering it, there was a potentially dangerous condition that
could lead to an accident. After the tow truck stopped, the plaintiff
turned around.7 8 The tow truck started up again, but this time the car
was not being steered. 79 The front end of the car moved sideways and
73. Reyes v. City of N.Y., 51 A.D. 3d 996 (N.Y. 2008); Roberts, 51 A.D.3d 246; Newcomb
v. Cuptail Holding Corp., 31 A.D.3d 875 (N.Y. 2006); Procopio v. Town of Saugerties, 20
A.D.3d 860 (N.Y. 2005); Coeing v. Town of Huntington, 10 A.D. 632 (N.Y. 2004); Sutton v. E.
N.Y. Youth Soccer Ass'n, 8 A.D.3d 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
74. See Reyes, 51 A.D.3d 996 (coach hit by foul ball that came through an opening
between fences); Roberts, 51 A.D.3d 246 (bystander struck by a baseball bat improvised off-
field on-deck area); Newcomb, 31 A.D.3d 875 (roller skater taking a break in practice rink
area a few feet from main rink precluded recovery); Procopio, 20 A.D.3d 860 (plaintiff at
concession stand ordering food hit by baseball thrown by a player warming up, precluded
from recovery); Coeing, 10 A.D. 632 (spectator watching son at little league game hit by foul
ball from adjacent field, precluded from recovery); Sutton, 8 A.D.3d 855 (soccer tournament
spectator precluded from recovery after getting hit by a ball which left the field, while
standing approximately 30-40 yards from the field at play during practice); see also, Cohen
v. Sterling Mets, L.P., 840 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (vendor injured when struck by a
fan who was diving for a t-shirt tossed into the stands between innings, precluded from
recovery); Powel v. Metro. Entm't, Inc., 195 Misc. 2d 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (attendee at a
concert could not recover for alleged hearing loss caused by loud music); Cannavale v. City
of N.Y., 257 A.D.2d 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (spectator trampled by oncoming players
while trying to move children standing too close to playing field, precluded from recovery);
Stern v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 226 A.D.2d 444 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (infant denied
recovery after being hit by a stray puck while sitting on steps in a hockey arena).
75. See Sutton, 8 A.D.3d at 858.
76. See Sutton, 8 A.D.3d 855.
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hit plaintiff.8 0 The Georgia Appellate court held that plaintiff could
recover.81
In analyzing assumption of risk, the court held that a plaintiff
had to have the requisite knowledge of the danger and appreciation of
the risk, and that a subjective standard applies. 82 "That is, what the
particular plaintiff knew, understood and appreciated" were the deter-
mining factors.83 "A plaintiff lacking such subjective knowledge of the
danger will not be taken to have assumed the risk even though his
conduct may be deemed contributory negligence for his failure under
an objective knowledge standard to discover the danger by exercising
the ordinary care required of a reasonable man."8 4 Thus, if plaintiff
should have known of a danger, but his conduct led to a lack of subjec-
tive knowledge of the danger, assumption of the risk will not bar
recovery, but contributory negligence may impact recovery.85 This is
much narrower than a New York standard, which applies assumption
of the risk to any risk plaintiff knew or should have known.
The attacks on the limited assumption of the risk doctrine gen-
erally are that the rule is old, so it must be changed. However, despite
what people may say during a deposition or at trial, it is hard to believe
that anybody who goes to a sporting event cannot anticipate that an
object might leave the field of play. Even if they have never been to
such a sporting event before, it is simple to realize that a ball can leave
the field of play. This should automatically put people on alert.
The public policy associated with the assumption of the risk
doctrine is to encourage spectators to view sporting events.86 Cer-
tainly, few people would want to go to sporting events where the fields
are completely surrounded by protective netting and/or Plexiglas. Not
only would this interfere with the viewing of the game, it would pre-
vent the possibility of obtaining a souvenir and restrict interaction
with the players.
In addition, the cost would be prohibitive. There are an un-
known number of parks and playgrounds in this country where there is
little protection other than a cage surrounding home plate. If assump-
tion of the risk and the limited duty doctrines were completely
80. Id.
81. Id. at 486.




86. See, cf. Shin v. AHN, 165 P.3d 581, 586-87 (Cal. 2007) (noting that liability for
injuries caused by errant sporting projectiles would discourage participation).
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abandoned, states and municipalities, as well as grade schools, high
schools, colleges, minor league teams, and major league teams, would
potentially be liable for any injuries to spectators, or have to spend
untold millions of dollars to completely surround the fields to protect
the spectators. Thus, there is a strong public policy to protect only
those in the most danger and to provide protection to those that want
it, while allowing a majority of fans to assume the risk inherent of
watching these games, most notably being hit by balls, pucks, and
other playing instruments.
V. A UNIFIED THEORY
Most people recognize that if a field is not completely sur-
rounded by a net, items, including balls, bats, etc., can leave the field
at play. Also, most people understand the concept of a ball, bat, etc.
leaving the field of play, particularly in sports such as baseball, which
is played virtually in every community in this country and in many
communities around the world. Indeed, one of the goals of baseball is
to hit the ball out of play for a homerun. The reasonable spectator has
an understanding that in virtually every sport, there is a danger, how-
ever slight, that items could leave the field of play injuring the
spectator.
This knowledge is the foundation of the assumption of risk doc-
trine. However, no spectator assumes all risks that may be
encountered at a sporting event. As the cases demonstrate, there are
certainly numerous times when an unexpected event occurs. Some-
times these events are clarified as a risk a spectator should assume,
others are not, and still others are given to a jury to decide whether a
reasonable spectator would assume such risk.
Complimentary to the assumption of risk doctrine is the limited
duty rule. Although set out in opposite terms, the actual theories are
similar. While assumption of risk looks at what risk the reasonable
spectator would assume, the limited duty rule looks at what actions
the owner/operator must take to protect spectators from reasonable
and foreseeable risks. The limited duty rule would impose a limited
obligation to protect spectators from certain identified, especially haz-
ardous risks. Under the limited duty rule owners/operators would
have a limited duty to provide some seats behind safety netting and to
protect spectators from the most hazardous dangers.
Of course, a general negligence theory can be used to determine
the owner's obligation outside of its limited duty and whether a specta-
tor assumes a certain risk while not in the stands as a spectator.
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However, the negligence theory should be used only when the spectator
is occupied in some other activity such as buying food at a concession
stand or other activities away from the field of play. When a spectator
is a pure spectator, sitting in the seats, this question is more appropri-
ately a question of law for the court. The possibility of inconsistent
verdicts regarding the same precautions and the nature of attending
sporting events, places this issue more properly before the court. Once
the spectator leaves the seating area, however, it should be up to a jury
to determine whether the owner/operator took appropriate steps to
protect the fans and/or whether the spectator assumed the risks of at-
tending a sporting event while outside the seating area.
The unified theory also combines the full assumption of risk ex-
clusion of liability as applied in New York, with the more limited
application exemplified by Georgia courts. While in the stands, the
presumption is that the spectator is aware of the risks involved in
viewing the game.8 7 While not an active spectator, the question would
be whether the spectator was actually aware of the risks.8 8
One problem in these cases is what specific protection should be
provided by the owner/operator to the spectators that are in the most
danger, e.g., behind the plate in baseball. The question is whether a
court should decide how large the protected netting should be, or
whether this issue should be sent to a jury. Permitting this issue to be
decided on a case-by-case basis by different juries is problematic at
best, and completely unworkable at worst. Juries could have conflict-
ing opinions about how large protective netting should be-50 feet
from home plate versus 100 feet from home plate, for example. One
jury could determine that the operator was reasonable in the size of its
protective netting, while another jury could find the same protective
netting completely unreasonable. It would be impossible to present a
workable system where a jury could decide the specific areas of protec-
tion for the spectators on a case-by-case basis.
This issue is best left to either the state legislature or the mu-
nicipal government. Certainly different requirements should be
imposed depending on the level of performance, age level of a partici-
pant, and the number of spectators. It is completely unreasonable to
have a little league field in a small village park held to the same re-
quirements as a professional stadium. Legislatures and/or local
building departments could take into account the age and performance
level of the participants and number of spectators in forming appropri-
87. See cases cited supra note 73.
88. See Sumner, 482 S.E.2d at 488.
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ate requirements regarding levels of protection for little league, high
school, college, minor and major league fields.
However, most often state legislatures and/or municipal build-
ing departments do not address these specific issues, including the size
of protective netting. Therefore, courts will continue to decide whether
the protection is sufficient to protect spectators from the greatest
hazards. In most states, the courts leave the specific issues to the vari-
ous owners and operators. As long as there is some protection, the
owner/operator has met its duty.
The fact that the existing rules have been called anachronistic
and inapplicable to the current state of tort law is equivalent to the
argument that change is better, no matter what that change is. Simply
because rules are old does not mean they are outdated. There are spe-
cific rules in place. Here, the rules balance the protection to spectators
from injuries that are inevitable in the type of activity and owner/oper-
ators from unreasonable requirements. As noted throughout this
article, people often attend events with an interest in obtaining souve-
nirs and interacting with participants. If all parts of the field were
protected, then enjoyable aspects of attending a game would be lost.
Spectators have an obligation to know the rules of the game and
should have a general knowledge, via common sense or otherwise, that
balls, equipment, and other objects could leave the field of play. While
the owner/operator is obliged to provide a certain level of protection,
spectators likewise have an obligation to protect themselves from in-
jury. The unified theory combining the assumption of the risk, limited
duty, and general negligence theories would protect owners and opera-
tors from burdensome litigation, while also protecting spectators who
are injured while their attention is necessarily diverted from the field
of play. Therefore, the unified theory provides the best compromise for
the application of the three theories.
VI. CONCLUSION
Rules regarding injuries to spectators must balance protecting
spectators from injury with the enjoyment of spectators at the event.
Completely isolating spectators from the playing field is unworkable,
and would be opposed by a vast majority of spectators that attend such
events. Thus, a theory must be developed to protect those spectators
who are most vulnerable, while permitting the vast majority of specta-
tors to freely enjoy the event.
The unified theory combining assumption of the risk, limited
duty, and general negligence would accomplish these goals. While
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spectators in general seating would be considered to have assumed the
risk of the standard hazards of attending events- ball, bats, and other
equipment leaving the field at play-the owners/operators would have
a limited duty to protect those most vulnerable patrons and those spec-
tators desiring protection. When there is a risk that a spectator does
not assume, or when they are not actually engaged as a spectator, the
general negligence theory could be used to determine whether the
owner/operator violated a duty owed to the spectators, depending on
the specific circumstances of the case.
